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Philosophy has long been part of the public life of human societies: one need only mention
Socrates in Greece or Confucius in China, or, to leap forward a couple of thousand years, Rousseau in
France and Hegel in Germany to recognize that philosophers can be taken very seriously by the
politicians, the journalists, the ordinary citizens of their eras.
But the idea of “public philosophy” as I will be discussing it here, is an artifact of the
professionalization of the discipline over the past two hundred years, with the rise of research
universities and, especially in the Anglophone world, after World War II, the rise of a professional class
of philosophers—“professional” in the precise sense that they earn their living by teaching and writing
about philosophy, paid either by private or mostly public universities to do so. There are now
numerous organizations that promote “public philosophy,” that seek to make philosophy “relevant” and
“significant” to the broader culture. These locutions are themselves striking, since philosophy is
relevant and significant to anyone--including presumably members of the “public”--who want to know
the truth or to know what they do and do not know, but that is obviously not what is meant by “public
philosophy.” Rather, the special purview of so-called “public philosophy” is to contribute philosophical
insight or knowledge or skill to questions of moral and political urgency in the community in which it is
located. So conceived, public philosophy is an artifact of what is usually called the “neoliberal” way of
thinking that has dominated the capitalist world completely since the 1980s, in which every human
activity justifies itself by its contribution to something for which there is demand in the marketplace.
The most extreme form of this pathology in a country with a formerly preeminent but now declining
1
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university system is England, where philosophers are asked to adduce evidence of their “impact” in
order to justify the funding of their work.1 “Impact” here does not mean influencing how other scholars
or students think about issues, but rather such ephemera as appearing on TV or having one’s research
discussed in a newspaper.
The idea of “public philosophy” so conceived—that is, philosophy as contributing to questions of
moral and political urgency in the community in which it is located—is paradoxical, however, for reasons
that I propose to discuss. The first puzzle may be simply put: normative philosophy has no wellestablished substantive conclusions about the right and the good—literally, none!--that could possibly
dictate to the polity at large what should be done. All biologists agree that the theory of evolution by
natural selection is crucial to understanding the diversity of life on the planet; all physicists agree that
Newtonian mechanics gives a correct description of the movement of mid-size physical objects; all moral
and political philosophers agree about nothing, except perhaps the very modest claim that all human
beings have equal moral standing. And they do not even really agree about that, since some major
philosophers, like Nietzsche, deny it; others deny that equality of moral standing attaches to species
membership at all; and all the rest differ so dramatically on what is required for or because of “equal
moral standing” that the apparent agreement is wholly illusory (consider: for Kantians, equal moral
standing requires something like rational personhood; for some utilitarians, something like sentience;
for Marxists, something like needs).2 Moral and political philosophers can not agree about whether the
right has priority over the good or vice versa; they can not agree about what the criterion of human
1

This is not the first time, of course, since the birth of the research universities that philosophers have had
to justify their place in it. But during prior iterations, the question was an intellectually and epistemically serious
one. As Frederick Beiser writes, regarding German academia a bit before mid-19th-century, “To receive funding, a
faculty had to demonstrate that its discipline was legitimate, that it had its own ‘scientific’ methods, and that it
occupied a necessary place in the academic division of labor.” After Hegel: German Philosophy, 1840-1900
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), p. 18. Demonstrating the existence of a Wissenschaft, of reliable
and rigorous methods for ascertaining knowledge, is quite a bit different than adducing evidence that The Daily
Mail noted one’s research.
2
See generally, Brian Leiter, “Moral Skepticism and Moral Disagreement in Nietzsche,” in R. Shafer-Landau
(ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 9 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). Cf. Brian Leiter, “The
Boundaries of the Moral (and Legal) Community,” Alabama Law Review
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well-being is; they can not agree about the correct formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative; they
can not agree whether agents in the Rawslian original position would choose deontological or utilitarian
principles; and so on.
Agreement may not secure the reliability of the claims agreed upon, of course,3 but such
agreement does seem a prerequisite for successful influence on questions of public interest. Consider a
pseudo-science like economics,4 which in the United States has had considerable influence on public
policy. That economists could present fairly unified fronts for significant periods of time—first, under
the Keynesian umbrella, subsequently under the “Chicago School” umbrella—no doubt lent credence to
their claimed epistemic authority. (Even there, one suspects that non-intellectual factors played a
major role in the explanation of the triumph of various economic orthodoxies at the level of policy.) In
the United States, at least, that apparent authority may now be ending, due partly to the very public
nature of the disagreements—a result primarily of the prominent polemics of the NeoKeynsian Paul
Krugman—and partly to what is increasingly apparent, namely, that macroeconomists, in either camp,
have almost no ability to predict any significant economic events. Putative sciences with no significant
predictive power eventually lose credibility.
But let us return to philosophy. No philosopher can even pretend to enter the fray of public
debate by reporting, “Philosophers have discovered that rule utilitarianism is the only correct way to
assess questions of public policy.” Nor can any philosopher intervene in a dispute by noting that “such a
policy would be unjust given the Rawlsian difference principle.” The “difference principle”—the idea
that economic rewards should be distributed in such a way as to maximize the position of the
economically worst-off in a society—is not a result or a discovery, but an intuition, the formalization of
some vague feelings about what justice involves. If a society ignores the difference principle—as
3

Derek Parfit, a leading contemporary moral philosopher, does think such agreement is essential to secure
the objective truth of moral conclusions. See his On What Matters…
4
On the failures of Neoclassical macroeconomics, see Alexander Rosenberg, Economics: Mathematical
Politics or Science of Diminishing Returns? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).
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essentially all do—there is no discernible consequence.5 If someone tries to ignore the laws of
Newtonian mechanics, the consequences are immediate!
In short, the first paradox of public philosophy is that philosophers enter into moral and political
debate purporting to offer some kind of expertise, but the expertise they offer can not consist in any
credible claim to know what is good, right, valuable, or any other substantive normative proposition that
might be decisive in practical affairs.
That brings us to the second paradox of public philosophy. If it is not substantive normative
knowledge that philosophers bring to debate, then perhaps it is a method or way of thinking about
contested normative questions that they offer. And this strikes me as a far more plausible suggestion,
one to which the many papers at this conference attest. Starting with certain normative intuitions,
public philosophers work out their entailments, demonstrating claims of the form, “If you believe X,
then you ought to believe Y,” and, “If you believe Y, you should not do Z.” What philosophers—at least
those in the broadly Socratic traditions—are good at is parsing arguments, clarifying the concepts at play
in a debate, teasing out the dialectical entailments of suppositions and claims, and so on: Socratic
philosophers are, in short, purveyors of what I will call “discursive hygiene.”
Although this constitutes a detour from my main claims, I want to emphasize that this
conception of moral and political philosophers as purveyors of discursive hygiene is compatible with the
emotivist theory of normative discourse defended by A.J. Ayer and Charles Stevenson in the middle of
the 20th-century, despite the fact that their meta-ethical views tend to be reviled today by those who
think they somehow distracted philosophers from important normative questions for a long period of
time. Recall that for Stevenson ethical judgments express, roughly, an attitude like, “I disapprove of X,
do so as well.” So they express pro- and con- (favorable and unfavorable) attitudes, plus a meta-attitude
about the attitudes others should have. Stevenson thought, correctly I believe, that the emotive
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meaning of ethical terms was central to understanding their centrality to social life. Ethical
disagreements are at bottom a function of disagreement in attitudes, rather than disagreements in
beliefs (here he follows Ayer): “ethical argument usually terminates when disagreement in attitude
terminates, even though a certain amount of disagreement in belief remains” (373). (He thinks this
counts in favor of explaining what we observe about moral disagreements, to wit, that they often end
when we secure agreement in belief, but seem interminable when they involve disagreements in
attitudes.) But this does not mean that all ethical disagreement is just brute clash of attitudes. As
Stevenson writes, “since attitudes are often functions of beliefs, an agreement in belief may lead
people, as a matter of psychological fact, to agree in attitude” (373) (cf. there is “the psychological fact
that altered beliefs may cause altered attitudes,” id.). Notice, though, that on Stevenson’s account, the
connection between particular facts and our attitudes is just a contingent psychological/causal fact: it is
just a psychological fact about many creatures like us that if our beliefs change, our attitudes often
change too.6 Philippa Foot, a famous critic of emotivism, emphasized this point: on Stevenson’s view,
she complains, “there are no rules validating particular inferences [from beliefs to evaluative attitudes],
but only causal connexions between the beliefs and attitudes concerned [98].”
Was Stevenson wrong in thinking that normative theory operates mainly by exploiting the fact
that creatures like us—or at least some of those creatures—are psychologically disposed to be moved
by certain kinds of inferential connections between our attitudes or between our attitudes and our
beliefs? Around the same time as Foot levelled her crtiques of Stevenson’s emotivism, Richard Brandt,
in his 1959 textbook Ethical Theory (a really crucial book for anyone who wants to understand the
sociology of Anlgophone moral theory in the last half-century), offered a similar challenge. Brandt asks
us to imagine the case of Mr. A and Mr. B who disagree about whether colleges should accept direct
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grants of money from the government, Mr. A holding a favorable attitude, Mr. B an unfavorable
attitude. Brandt writes (p. 219):
We do not consider an argument relevant or well-taken just because it is successful in
influencing attitudes. If Mr. B. is a legislator and Mr. A wants to influence his vote, there are
various “arguments” he might use that no one would think ethically relevant. Mr. A might say:
“Your alma mater will surely go bankrupt unless this bill is passed.” Or, perhaps better, he might
say, “Your daughter will be admitted to ____ College, if you vote for this bill; otherwise she
won’t be.” These arguments may be of wonderful effect in changing Mr. B’s attitudes, but they
are not ethically relevant. On the contrary, suppose Mr. A argues about the importance of
having independent educational institutions, where absolutely uncensored thinking and
discussion can occur. In this case, Mr. A will have argued relevantly, irrespective of whether Mr.
B is interested.
Unnoted by Brandt is that the judgment that an attitude-altering argument is not “ethically relevant” is
itself an evaluative judgment, so the expression of another attitude, according to the emotivist. So what
Brandt’s example really illustrates is that we also have pro- and con- attitudes about the kinds of
arguments that influence attitudes, which is hardly surprising. In other words, sometimes we not only
want someone to change their attitude, we want them to do so for a non-self-interested reason,
because we have an unfavorable attitude towards self-interested considerations and a favorable
attitude towards those we denominate “ethical” considerations.7
I believe that Stevenson had it exactly right: changes in belief do influence changes in attitude,
but only as a contingent, psychological fact; this include changes in belief about the logical or inferential
relations between beliefs or between beliefs and attitudes. This brings us to the second paradox of
public philosophy. Although philosophers can contribute no substantive knowledge about the good and
7
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the right, they can contribute discursive hygiene. But discursive hygiene plays almost no role in public
life, and an only erratic, and highly contingent, role in how people form beliefs about matters of moral
and political urgency. Both points deserve notice, but they are distinct.
The absence of discursive hygiene in public life should be familiar to anyone who reflects on it.
Public debate, including in democracies, is awash in fallacious inferences, non-sequiturs, and arguments
based on obviously false premises. I shall give just one example, chosen only because it is recent and I
know a lot about it because I was involved in the public debate. The University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign, a major public research university in my home state in America, offered a tenured position
on its faculty to a man named Steven Salaita; Dr. Salaita writes about colonialism and the experiences of
colonized peoples, including the Palestinians in the Middle East. (Salaita himself is a PalestinianAmerican.) He was offered a tenured position at the University of Illinois in October 2013, accepted it
fairly quickly, and the University began making arrangements for his arrival and for his teaching to start
in late August of this year. Dr. Salaita is also an active user of social media, including Twitter. In
response to the Israeli attack on Gaza in the spring and summer of this year, Dr. Salaita begain
“tweeting” vigorous moral outrage at the slaughter of children and civilians, and at the apologists for
these crimes, and began expressing himself in increasingly vulgar and hostile terms. I will give just one
example. Dr. Salaita re-posted on his Twitter page a comment someone else made about an American
journalist named Jeffrey Goldberg, who is an utterly shameless and morally bankrupt apologist for any
crimes committed by Israel. Here is the statement that Dr. Salaita “re-tweeted”:
Jeffrey Goldberg's story should have ended at the pointy end of a shiv.
A “shiv,” for those who do not know, is a sharp knife, like the kind that might also be known as a
“bayonet” attached to a rifle. The most natural reading of this tweet—contrary to some defenders of
Dr. Salaita—was that he wished Goldberg dead. That’s not a nice sentiment, but it is not illegal in the
U.S. to express such a wish on your Twitter account, and far more illustrious writers than Dr. Salaita
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have made the same point. We need only recall Heinrich Heine, one of the great German writers of the
19th-century, who famously expressed the wish that “if God wants to make my happiness complete, he
will grant me the joy of seeing some six or seven of my enemies hanging from [the] trees” in front of his
cottage. It is easy enough to understand how someone who believes his people are the victims of
violent oppression might wish apologists for this oppression dead.
We only know about this “tweet” because, in the United States, there are a large number of socalled “conservative”--mainly reactionary and crypto-fascist--websites and media outlets devoted to
monitoring and harassing university professors who deviate from what they regard as “acceptable”
opinion. These websites began publicizing other examples of offensive, sometimes vulgar “tweets” by
Dr. Salaita in July of this year. Soon alumni and wealthy donors to the University of Illinois began
complaining to the University about this prospective hire. Although the tenured appointment had been
approved by the Department, by the Dean, and by the Provost a year ago, the Chancellor on August 1 of
this year notified Dr. Salaita she would not forward the appointment to the Board of Trustees for final
approval (ordinarily pro forma in every prior case).
From a legal point of view, the issues here are fairly clear cut. In the United States, it is illegal
for a public university to deny employment to someone because of their political point of view: that
violates their constitutional right to free speech and freedom of association. Citizens also have a wellestablished constitutional right in the United States to express their political views in vulgar and
offensive terms. From a constitutional point of view, these claims are banal and familiar to lawyers and
scholars. Yet the Chairman of the University’s Board of Trustees, in justifying the firing of Dr. Salaita,
declared that "there can be no place" for "disrespectful and demeaning speech" "in our democracy, and
therefore, there will be no place for it in our university." As a factual matter, there is quite a lot of
disrespectful and demeaning speech in American democracy, and, more importantly, the University of
Illinois, as a public university, and thus subject to constitutional limits, must permit such speech, at least
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to the extent it takes place outside the classroom. (Inside the classroom, it likely would disrupt the
university’s pedagogical mission, and so could be regulated, but that was not at issue here.) The
Chairman went further, saying that he believes only in “free speech tempered in respect for human
rights." There are some countries where this statement would make sense: in Germany, for example,
human dignity is the fundamental constitutional value, which can trump freedom of expression. But
American constitutional law is the opposite of German: there is no doctrine of “free speech tempered in
respect for human rights,” what is called in other jurisdictions “hate speech” is fully protected under
American law. Anyone interested in the prospects of public philosophy should think hard about this
case: we have a public official, the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of a major public university in the
United States, who is completely ignorant of the basic facts of American constitutional law, making
assertions that are both false and, if implemented, wholly illegal. Can one imagine the travesty that
would result were there to be subtle issues of philosophical argumentation at stake?
Alas, this public stupidity was not anomalous in this affair. Chicago’s leading newspaper, the
Chicago Tribune, defended the decision8 to fire Salaita on the grounds that his critical comments
constituted “hate speech.” I want to emphasize that Chicago is the third largest city in the United
States, and this newspaper serves a community of eight million people: after The New York Times, the
Tribune is one of the three or four most significant newspapers in my country. Yet nowhere does the
editorial defending the obviously illegal firing of Salaita in the Chicago Tribune even mention that “hate
speech” is constitutionally protected in the United States. The editorial does not even mention that
under most “hate speech” legislation in other countries that I have seen, nothing Salaita said would
qualify.
I must underline that I am here talking about clear points of law, not hard philosophical
questions. Yet the editors of a major American newspaper and the public official chairing a major
8
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American University’s Board of Trustees do not even understand simple legal points, and so make claims
and arguments that are false and fallacious. I wish this problem were only confined to the United
States, but I am sure I do not need to persuade members of this audience that it is, sadly, not.9 So what
hope is there for public philosophy—for the discursive hygiene that philosophers can offer—in a world
like this?
That discursive hygiene should be almost wholly absent from public debate is not surprising
given the psychological evidence that people’s beliefs about matters of moral and political urgency—
and, perhaps, more important, what they do based on those beliefs—are only slightly influenced by a
regime of discursive hygiene; instead, their emotional and affective responses mostly determine their
moral attitudes. Consider the psychologist Jonathan Haidt’s famous work on the “social intuitionist”
model of moral judgment (Haidt 2001) according to which in most ordinary situations, moral judgments
are produced by emotional or affective responses, the reasons adduced in their support being post-hoc:
they do not explain the judgment, as evidenced by the resilience of the judgment even in the face of the
defeat of the proferred reasons. Thus, in one famous case, Haidt describes to experimental subjects the
case of a brother and sister who decide, after discussion, to experiment with incestuous sex. All the
expertimental subject thinks this is wrong, but the scenario, as described by Haidt, rules out all the
reasons for thinking it wrong: the brother and sister only do it once, they do it voluntarily and are happy
with the experiment, they use birth control to insure no pregnancy results, no one knows what they did,
and so on. But people’s visceral reaction remains powerful and unshakeable, even when the reasons
they give for their judgment are defeated by the facts of the hypothetical. In the realm of ordinary
moral judgment, emotion trumps reason.

9

See, e.g., Pankaj Mishra, “Modi’s Idea of India, International New York Times, October 25-26, 2014, pp. 67, which discusses the outrageous historical fabrications and misunderstandings common among the Hindu
nationalists, who claim Modi as their leader.
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We also know from work in empirical psychology that individuals “with selective deficits in
emotional processing” due to disease or injury to the brain render different moral judgments about
hypothetical situation like the Trolley cases, than most emotionally normal subjects to hypothetical
situations (Cushman et al. 2010: 53-54), suggesting that the emotional responses are the real causes of
the moral judgments. Psychologist and philosopher Joshua Greene (2007) has argued that emotional
responses loom larger in deontological than consequentialist moral judgments, the latter demanding
more “controlled cognition” (Cushman et al. 2010: 54), but in more recent work even Greene has
acknowledged that “affect [or emotion] supplies the primary motivation to view harm as a bad thing” in
the first place, so that even consequentialist reasoning has “an affective basis” (Cushman et al. 2010:
62). More precisely, according to Greene et al. “affect supplies the primary motivation to regard harm
as bad. Once this primary motivation is supplied, reasoning proceeds in a currency-like manner
[“currency emotions are designed to participate in the process of practical reasoning”]” (Cushman et al.
2010: 63). “[A]larm-bell emotions are designed to circumvent reasoning” (id. at 62) and, arguably, this
is “the origin of the welfare principle” (id.)
In a recent review of the empirical literature, Timothy Schroeder, Adina Roskies and Shaun
Nichols found that the view they dub “sentimentalism”—namely, the view that “the emotions typically
play a key causal role in motivating moral behavior” (Schroeder et al. 2010: 77)—is well-supported by
the “evidence from psychology and neuroscience” (Schroeder et al. 2010: 98), and that while
“motivation derived [exclusively] from higher cognitive centers independently of desire is possible…the
only known model of it is pathological” involving Torrette syndrom (Schroeder et al. 2010: 94). Such
empirical findings do not rule out the possibility that moral judgments can be influenced by what I have
been calling discursive hygiene, but they certainly explain why so much of public discourse is manifestly
irrational and emotion-driven.
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But the research on the role of irrational emotional responses to moral questions is just the tip
of the iceberg. The real problem, of course, is that prejudice and bias are dominant forces in human life.
What I will call Tribalism--the propensity of creatures like us to identify with those “like themselves,”
and to view others as unacceptably different, deficient, depraved, and perhaps dangerous10--is, as any
realistic appraisal of human affairs will reveal, the dominant force in public life. Tribalism—whether it is
Irish Catholics killing Irish Protestants, or Shia Muslims terrorizing Sunni Muslims, or working class
American whites hating working class American blacks—is the curse of our species, against which
discursive hygiene is the most feeble of weapons. As Nietzsche observed, “Nothing is easier to erase
than a dialectical effect” (TI __: __), and he was only thinking of Socrates’s argumentative harasssment
of the rich youth of Athens. Given that Tribalist prejudices engage a range of powerful emotions—pride,
self-respect, resentment, and others—how can discursive hygiene make an impact?
It may be said that Tribalism’s terrain has receded, especially in the last two hundred years, and
that certainly seems to be true in various parts of the world. But we may reasonably ask what role
discursive hygiene actually played in this process? Consider that the post-World War II consensus that
emerged in many democracies about the importance of “universal human rights” only emerged after
the ghastly slaughters that resulted from the extreme Tribalism of German and Japanese fascists and
racists. Argument played little or no role; emotional revulsion at barbarity did.

Yet Tribalist loyalties

and prejudices remain ferocious, in America, in Iraq, in Israel, in India, in Pakistan and elsewhere. The
great cosmopolitan ideal of the 19th-century, famously expressed by Karl Marx, was that, “Human

emancipation will only be complete when the real, individual man has…in his everyday life, in
his work, and in his relationships…become a species-being [Gattungswesen] (Tucker, 46),” that
Marxian ideal of human beings who recognize their social and existential interdepence in
producing the conditions of their existence qua human beings, but who no longer identify as
10
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simply the self-interested members of their tribes. That Marxian ideal remains an aspiration,
even as some tribalist loyalties have receded over the last century.
The key point, however, is that we philosophers must recognize that moral change depends
fundamentally on the emotional attitudes of people, and that these attitudes tend in a strongly Tribalist
direction.11 And the most plausible explanations for the evolution of such attitudes do not, alas, assign
much role to discursive hygiene. Consider selectionist explanations, which are all the rage these days in
philosophy and the social sciences. These explanations appeal to evolution by natural selection, as
opposed to all the other evolutionary mechanisms (e.g., genetic hitchhiking or genetic drift) that affect
the evolution of species. Such explanations have serious limitations,12 but they do help explain the
persistence of tribalist tendencies. First, these explanations concern only the evolutionary explanation
of altruism, that is, concern for others, a kind of concern that can, of course, be far more tepid than
considering the “other” to be a full-fledged member of the non-tribal moral community, whose
suffering, for example, has as much moral salience as the suffering of anyone else. Second, the only
well-confirmed and generally accepted evolutionary hypothesis in the literature--deriving from the work
of biologist W.D. Hamilton--involves altruistic concern for kin, that is, for organisms that share some of
the genetic make-up of the altruist. From a selectionist point of view, so the Hamiltonian argument
goes, altruistic concern for kin can be highly effective in passing on genetic material to the next
generation as long as that concern is directed towards kin, such as sisters or cousins or aunts who have
some of the same genetic material. Thus, natural selection will select for a genetic predisposition to
nurture and sustain kin, since they too can pass the genetic inheritance on. That, of course, is a far cry
from viewing non-kin, indeed utter strangers, regardless of race or religion or tribe, as entitled to basic
moral consideration, but it is certainly consistent with the Tribalism we observe. Third, even the more
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ambitious selectionist arguments for “group selectionism,” associated with Elliott Sober and David Sloan
Wilson, would still fail to explain the evolution of moral sensibilities beyond tribalist ones, since, at best,
these arguments tell us why individuals might develop altruistic concern for members of their group who
are not kin; they do not explain why human communities might come to adopt non-tribalist moral
ideals.
Doubts about the prospects of discursive hygiene are strikingly illustrated by considering the
case of Peter Singer, undoubtedly the most successful “public philosopher” in the Anglophone world in
recent years, though in a somewhat schizophrenic way: he is lauded for his defense of the rights of
non-human animals, but also denounced (indeed, sometimes banned from speaking--in Germany, for
example) for his willingness to approve of the killing of defective human beings. Singer is, however, a
paragon of consistent discursive hygiene. He has argued, on the one hand, that our treatment of nonhuman animals is morally indefensible, since the suffering of a sentient creature is what is morally
salient,13 not the species of the sufferer. Yet, on the other hand, he has argued that it can be morally
justifiable to kill human infants afflicted with various kinds of cognitive and physical defects, since to
allow them to live would, over the long term, produce more suffering than happiness. If one thought
infanticide was morally abhorrent—as a matter of brute moral attitude—then one might take Singer’s
position as a simple reductio of the idea that suffering per se is the only thing that is morally relevant,
since it leads to an absurd and heinous conclusion. Singer has no actual argument against such a
response, since his entire position rests simply on an equally brute, and unexplained, emotional
attitude, namely, that suffering per se is abhorrent.14 But if the consequence of believing that suffering
per se (regardless of species) is the only thing that is morally salient leads to the conclusion that it is
13

There are nuances of Singer’s views I am ignoring here: e.g., he talks in terms of desire-satisfaction,
rather than pleasure and pain, though this comes to the same thing in the case of non-human animals. Singer also
thinks sapience can be morally salient, insofar as it affects the experience of pleasure and pain (or the satisfaction
of desires).
14
He sometimes derides responses like this as failures to follow through a principled and rational
argument, but such responses are obviously question-begging.
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permissible to kill human babies with defects, it is equally reasonable to take that to show that species
membership (namely, being human) is morally salient, since it explains why killing human babies is
wrong, even when their cognitive and physical defects will impose burdens on others. That this rather
obvious point is not much acknowledged in the philosophical literature should make even philosopehrs
wonder what role discursive rationality as opposed to other forces are playing in their arguments.
From a serious philosophical point of view, of course, it should hardly be surprising that it is not
rationally obligatory to think the suffering of non-human animals is on a par with that of humans. More
general lessons of twentieth-century philosophy, I believe, show that no belief about any subject-matter
is rationally obligatory for all agents regardless of their ends. First, from the famous Duhem-Quine
thesis15 about the under-determination of scientific theories by evidence, we know that there are not
even any scientific hypotheses that are rationally obligatory, in the sense of required by logic and
evidence. This is because any recalcitrant evidence elicited in a test of an hypothesis is compatible with
the hypothesis as long as we are willing to give up the background assumptions such a test requires. In
choosing among competing hypotheses and background assumptions, we must always fall back on nonrational considerations, such as theoretical simplicity, methodological conservatism, and consilience.16
Second, unless there were a plausible substantive conception of rationality (there does not appear to be
one, alas), then rationality itself is instrumental, imposing normative constraints only on the means
chosen to realize our ends, whatever they may happen to be. Thus, even norms for belief are hostage
to ultimate ends, and so particular beliefs are “irrational” only relative to the believer’s ends.17 Neither
Singer nor anyone else can show that one is rationally required to rule out ends (like forbidding
infanticide) which require as a matter of instrumental reasoning the repudiation of the moral salience of
suffering without regard to species.
15
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Given our general epistemological predicament—namely, that no belief is rationally obligatory-it becomes even more interesting to ask what role discursive hygiene can play in public life? Even Peter
Singer has acknowledged18 that one of the most influential parts of his 1975 book Animal Liberation was
not the Benthamite argument mentioned already, but rather the emotionally evocative description of
factory-farming practices in Chapter 3 of his book. These descriptions evoked the suffering of sentient
creatures, and so elicited feelings of compassion from readers quite effectively. But from Singer’s
perspective, the moral salience of suffering also entails the moral permissibility of infanticide, and it is
easy enough to see that even a rather discreet description of infanticide factories or hospices (call them
what you want) would immediately elicit a very different set of moral intuitions and feelings. Clearly
our emotional responses to vivid descriptions of factory-farmed chickens and the painless killing of
defective human babies are not going to yield a rational verdict about the moral propriety of either
practice.19
So if Tribalism and emotion dominate most moral thinking in the public sphere, should we
simply not bother with “public philosophy”? That is not, in fact, the skeptical conclusion I draw and it is
important to emphasize why. First, of course, some of us, both citizens and philosophers, want to try to
reason our way to sound views of moral and political questions of public significance, despite the
irrational and Tribalist tendencies of most public discourse. That may effectively render “public
philosophy” private, defeating its originaly neoliberal rationalization: but perhaps that needs to be
acknowledged. The primary reason for trying to figure out what is right and wrong in public affairs is to
figure out what is right and wrong, not necessarily to influence public policy. Second, let us also
remember that we do not understand well the conditions under which discursive hygiene matters to
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public policy over the long haul, and that is an additional reason for philosophers to continue trying to
cleanse public debate and reasoning of its fallacies and non-sequiturs: discursive hygiene may lead
philosophers to satisfactory conclusions about the right and the good, but it also may, through causal
channels we do not yet understand very well, lead society to similar conclusions.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, we do know that the discipline closest to philosophy—
namely, law—is grounded in a commitment to discursive hygiene as well, albeit less rigorously and
formally. Judges give reasons for their decisions, and those reasons are based on premises, from which
inferential steps purportedly follow. Judges are influenced by a myriad of non-legal factors, but
discursive hygiene matters to them, as even those great skeptics of 20th-century Anglophone
jurisprudence, the American Legal Realists, repeatedly emphasized. Let us recall the anecdote invoked
by Jerome Frank, one of the two most important American Realists and the most skeptical of the group;
he observed:
A century ago a great American judge, Chancellor Kent, in a personal letter explained his
method of arriving at a decision. He first made himself “master of the facts.” Then (he wrote) “I
saw where justice lay, and the moral sense decided the court half the time. I then sat down to
search the authorities…I might once in a while be embarrassed by a technical rule, but I almost
always found principles suited to my view of the case….20
Frank took this to be illustrative of the general form of legal decision-making by judges, namely, that
they arrive at their decision based on their “moral sense” about what would be a fair outcome given
what happened. In this regard, Frank’s picture is still consistent with Haidt’s “social intuitionist” model
of moral judgment. But notice that the account Frank endorses has two other striking features: first,
judges, on Frank’s picture, still want to find legal principles that will justify deductively the conclusion
they find morally attractive; and second, judges can still be “embarrassed by a technical rule,” that is,

20

Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (1930), Ch. XII, p. ___ note.
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they can come to recognize that the result they deem fair is not permissible discurisvely because of the
logical entailments of the controlling legal rules. Those concessions by a radical skeptic like Jerome
Frank about rational decision-making about practical questions should remind us that even in the sphere
of emotional reaction and Tribalism, discursive hygiene can still exert pressures. Public philosophy can
contribute to those pressures.
This will no doubt seem too tepid a conclusion to those whose vision of philosophy is different
than mine. But, like the Skeptics of antiquity, and like the great modern skeptics about reason, namely,
Hume and Nietzsche, I think we must recognize that reason underdetermines what to believe, even in
the best of circumstances, and that, unsurprisingly, in the worst of circumstances--such as public
discourse--non-rational factors overwhelm all others. We philosophers labor at the margins of public
life, public life being dominated by irrational emotion and Tribalist prejudice. But in ways we can not
always anticipate, our labors in the service of discursive hygiene may matter. Law is our ally in this
regard, because lawyers are the practical torch-bearers of discursive hygiene. But lawyers understand
something that most philosophers—the Sophists, Marx, and Nietzsche are prominent exceptions—do
not understand, namely, that rhetoric--the art of persuasion apart from appeal to what follows from
discursive hygiene—matters, and often matters decisively, in what the public believes. “Belief fixation,”
the process by which certain beliefs take hold in the cognitive and affective economy of the mind and
thus yield action, does not necessarily track evidential, inferential and logical relations that interest
philosophers: the empirical evidence for that is, by now, overwhelming. Rhetoric was always, from the
Sophists onward, the art of producing belief fixation, and it is not taught sufficiently either in law or
philosophy faculties.
Of course, rhetoric does not tell us what beliefs we should try to produce with our rhetorical
tools, but for reasons I have already discussed, it is doubtful that discursive hygiene will help us on this
score. The two great polemicists of modern philosophy, Marx and Nietzsche, understood this, despite
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their differences in moral attitudes. Marx did not engage in public philosophy in the sense now
fashionable in professional philosophy: he did not offer reasons why the abolition of capitalism was just
or morally obligatory. Instead, Marx offered a causal-explanatory theory of historical and economic
change, taking for granted that as capitalism immiserated the mass of humanity, the understanding of
how things really work would suffice to produce action, since the motivations of the vast majority to
change things could be taken for granted. Nietzsche, by contrast, viewing almost all philosophy in the
Socratic tradition as a kind of fraud, the attempt to rationalize the emotional prejudices of particular
cultures, or particularly sick individuals (as Nietzsche viewed most philosophers), wanted to displace it
with a self-conscious “legislation of values,” values in the service of making life worth living. For
Nietzsche, this meant living in a world in which genius and its aesthetically pleasing products prevailed,
something to which he thought the ascetic moralities of the last two thousand years constituted
obstacles. Marx and Nietzsche both were “public philosophers”—Marx during his lifetime in some
measure, Nietzsche only afterwards—and both on a scale undreamed of by any academics of the last
hundred years, yet neither was primarily a practitioner of discursive hygiene in the sense of neoliberal
“public philosophy.” There may be an important lesson in this fact for aspiring “public philosophers,”
who should give at least as much attention to rhetoric as to discursive hygiene. We need discursive
hygiene for the study and the seminar room; but in public, we need something else, something much
more important, namely, rhetorical skill that will make our academic conclusions salient to a public too
often influenced by emotion and Tribalist sympathies.
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